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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
WILLIAM N. CHRISTIANSEN, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Vi-:. 
VINCENT L. REES, DOE I and DOE II, 
fessional Corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
and THE SALT LAKE CLINIC, a Pro- , 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE 
NO. 10731 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is a malpractice action for compensatory dam-
ages against a medical doctor and others who may be liable, 
for negligently causing the broken end of a surgical needle 
to be left in the Appellant's body during a medical opera-
tion. 
DISPOSITION IN WWER COURT 
At pretrial upon the Defendants' motion, the Court 
dismissed the action with prejudice on the ground that it 
was barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a decision setting aside the judg-
ment of the trial court and remanding the case to the lower 
court for trial on the merits. 
S1'A'i'ElWENT OF FACTS 
About September 1950, the Appellant began seeing Dr. 
Floyd Cannon, a partner in the Salt Lake Clinic, for treat-
ment of a diarrhetic condition (Christensen, Depos., pp. 8 
& 9). Dr. Rees, another partner in the Clinic (now a p:ro-
fusffional corporation), first saw the Appellant in August 
1951, in connection with a minor hemorrhoid operation 
which he performed. In February 1952, Dr. Rees also re-
moved the Appellant's ileum, and in December of the same 
year he performed a total colectomy. Finally, on .Aipril 
12, 1955, he removed the Appellant's anus (Christiansen 
Depos., pp. 9-11). Following a final ~amination by Dr. 
Rees, which was made upon the patient's release from tile 
hospital the Appellant returned to Mayfield, Utah, where 
he was placed under the care of a local doctor and was not 
treated again by the Resix>ndents. 
Subsequent to the operation af 1955, the patient had 
become extremely nervous and irritable, experiencing pain 
in his lower body, chills, impotency and other symptoms. 
At the time of his release from the hospital, the Appellant 
had asked Dr. Rees about these symptoms and was told 
that "time will heal it." (Christiansen Deposition, pp. 21 
and 47). After returning to southern Utah, the Appellant 
continued to complain from time to time to his family doc-
tor, who repeatedly reassured the Appellant that the dis-
comfort was normal and that the symptoms would grad-
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ually disappear in time (Christiansen rDeposition, pp. 19, 
21 and 43), but the condition did not improve and the Ap-
pellant eventually began consulting Dr. Stewart, of Gunni-
. ;on. who, in 1962, referred the patient to Dr. Endsley, a 
physician in Provo, in the belief that the Appellant was 
suifein!-~ from kidney stones. On the subject of Appellant's 
meclical history, Dr. Endsley reports the following: 
"This patient is seen for evaluation of the problem of 
recurrent leH flank pain, chills, fever, and pyuria of ap-
prnxirnately 6 years duration. This patient has had a 
three stage collectomy for ulcerative colitis with an 
ileostomy in 1955. Since the collectomy was begun 
the patient has had recurrent left flank and lower 
guadrant pain with recurrent pyuria, chills and fever. 
" 
Dr. Endsl<e>y, who is a specialist, was unable to dis-
cowr the sow·ce of the pain, despite an extensive physical 
examination, until X-rays revealed the presence of a for-
eign object in the Appellant's body on July 14, 1962. The 
rarliologist who took the X-Rays, Dr. James Matheson of 
the Utah Valley L.D.S. Hospital, made the following diag-
nostic conclusions, which he furnished to Dr. Endsley: 
"Impression: 1. No lesion is seen in the intravenous 
pyelogram to the extent of visualiza-
tion. 
2. The spleen appears slightly enlarged. 
NOTE: There is a curvolinear metalic-like density 
just above the synphgals pubis which has 
the X-ray appearance of a broken surgical 
needle." 
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Later the same day, in which the X-ray photographs 
were made, Dr. Endsley performed an exploratory opera-
tion without any substantial finding. Dr. Endsley then 
sent the patient to Dr. Matheson again for further X-rays, 
which were taken on August 7, 1962. Dr. Matheson's re-
port reads as follows: 
"AP & Lateral Views of the Pelvis. 
The curvolinear metallic density thought to be a por-
tion of a surgical needle is seen in the soft tiS9Ue just 
below the coccyx and slightly posterior. It lies almost 
in the midline just barely to the right. The lower 
two segments of the coocyx are not visible and this 
may be due to surgical removal." 
Subsequent to that report, Dr. Endsley performed a 
second operation in which he attempted to locate the needle 
in the bladder. As his post-operative comment in the hos-
pital record shorws, however, he was unsuccessful. 
The appellant's first knowledge that there was a needle 
in his body and that it had been left there during the oper-
ative procedure performed by the Respondent, <Dr. Rees, 
was the statement of Dr. Endsley to the Appellant that a 
surgical needle had been left in his body, apparently from 
the operation performed by Dr. Rees. This information 
was conveyed to the Appellant between July 16, 1962, and 
August 4, 1962. 
It was stipulated by counsel for the Respondent at pre-
trial that, for purposes of the motion for summary judg-
ment, the following facts were to he taken as true: 
(1) That the needle in Mr. Christiansen's back was 
a surgical needle; 
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(2) That it was left there during and a result of the 
Jc.st operation performed by the Respondent on Mr. Chris-
tiansen on or about April 12, 1955; and 
(3) That no other operations had been performed 
@ that portion of the Appellant's body until the needle was 
foLmd in 1962. 
Even though Dr. Endsley felt that it was advisable to 
retm,vc the needle and made an effort to do so, the needle 
1\-a.s r;ot where he thought it was and the exploratory oper-
aCon, conocquently, proved to be unsuccessful. There has 
lkcil no subsquent attempt to extract the needle and it has 
JCmained in the Appellant's body at the location dia-
~~rzuned by Dr. Matheson until the present date. 
ARGUMENT 
TIIE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING TIIE 
RES?ONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON THE GROUND THAT THE ACTION WAS BARRED 
UNDER UTAH LAW BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
Traditionally, the justification given by the courts in 
applying the harsh and often inequitable laws limiting the 
period in which an action may be brought has been a fear 
that injustice might result if an end coruld not be made, 
sometime, to the possibility of litigation. As a consequence 
of this fear, an arbitrary, but useful point has been chosen 
by the Legislature at four years from the time at Which 
the period began to run. 
Unfortunately, it has never been clear, as evidenced by 
the myriad interpretations all over the country, at just 
what point the statute begins to run. While the Appellant 
6 
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accepts, reluctantly, the obvious utility of providing some 
cutoff point for litigation, it does not appear to the Appel-
lant that Utah law requires that po~nt to be the one ohosen 
by the trial court in the case at hand. Indeed, in view of 
the liberal trend in this area, it woold seem that a total 
consideration of the problem requires an entirely different 
conclusion: that the statute of limitations should be inter-
preted to run, in malpractice actions, from the date of dis-
covery by the Plaintiff, not from the date of the negligent 
act. 
It appears to the Appellant that the only important 
issue before the Court is the proper construction to be 
placed on the applicable statute of limitation, Title 78-12-
25, U.C.A., in the light of: (1) legislative pmpose, to the 
degree that it can be ascertained; (2) national and Utah 
case 1aw to the extent that actual holdings, as opposed to 
obiter dicta, can be found; and ( 3) public policy arguments, 
particularly where legislative purpose is unclear. The stat 
ute reads as follows: 
"78-12-25. Within four yars. - Within four years: 
( 2) An actioo for relief not otherwise provided 
for by law." 
It may readily be seen that sub-section two, which is 
the relevant portion of the statute, is a catch-all provision, 
enacted, in all likelihood, without specific consideration by 
the Legislature of when the period should begin to run in 
malpractice actions. The only legislative purpose mani-
fested by the wording is that of enacting a statute of limi-
tations provision broad enougih to cover all types of actions 
not previously dealt with specifically. It is thus highly 
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probable that the Legislature never considered the special 
problem before the Court in the instant case. The ques-
tion, therefore, becomes: what would the Legislature have 
done had it been presented with the specific problem of this 
case; when does the Statute of Limitations begin to run in 
a malpractice action, from the date of discovery by the in-
jurc:d ut from the date of the negligent act? 
It is the contention of the Appellant that the public 
policy of the State insofar as it has been expressed by the 
Legislature, supports the running of the statute from the 
date of discovery. This public policy finds explicit enunci-
ation in Title 78-12-26, U.C.A. dealing with injuries to real 
and personal property, fraud or mistake, and liability un-
der state statutes, and 78-12-27, U.C.A., covering actions 
against corporate stockholders or directors. While other 
sections, such as that dealing with limitation of contract-
ual liability, may expressly name some other point of be-
gining such as the point a:t which the last charge was made, 
this is reasonably given the intrinsic differences between 
contractual and tort liability and their differenres in terms 
of ease of discovery of the wrong. It seems clear that had 
limitations om malpractice liability been dealt with specifi-
cally by the Legislature, the protection given the plaintiff 
in other areas would have been extended to cover malprac-
tice actions. 
A concrete illustration of this interpretation of legis-
ative purpose is the case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 
73 Utah 46, 72 P2d 1277, in which it was held that the stat-
ute began running at the date of discovery even though 
the applicable section, 104-2-20 (1943 Code), made no men-
tion of discovery. Significantly, the discovery principle 
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was codified, even at that early date, by the related section 
104-2-24. Since the court held that the period run from 
discovery even though Section 20 was silent on the subject, 
it is obvious that the omission of specific reference to dis-
covery in Title 78-12-26. in no way implies a rejection of t11e 
discovery principle by the Legislature especially given the 
catch-all, generalized nature of the section. 
It is the position of the Appellant that legislative in-
tent, if it were able to express itself today, wauld be that 
the period begins running at the date of discovery of the 
negligent act by the plaintiff. This follows from a consid-
eration of what must be recognized as a basic trend in the 
law towards the liberal discovery principle. While it is rec-
ognized th'.l.t two lines of authority exist, successive read-
ing of 74 ALR 1319, 144 ALR 212 and 80 ALR 2d 368 can-
not fail to impress the reader with the existence of a wide-
spread trend in the direction of the better reasoned and 
more liberal rule. The most prominent of the discovery 
principle jurisdictions is California, but, as shown by 80 
ALR 2d 388, the discovery p1inciple has now been accep-
ted in approximately half the cases in which it has been 
considered , and the proportion following the discovery prin-
ciple, as shown by the ALR 2d Later Case Service, Vol. 5. 
' . 
appears to be much greater. In addition to the jurisdic-
tions listed in 80 ALR 2d 388, the following jurisdictions 
have since either ~dopted the discovery rule om initial con-
sideration or have reversed previous decisions in following 
the discovery rule: Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 NW 
2d 581; Stacey v. Pantane, 177 Neb. 694, 131 NW 2d 163: 
Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A2d 277; Seitz v. 
Jones, 370 P2d 300; Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 
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lS5. :;89 P2d 224; Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 
NW2d 785; Mosby v. Michael Reese Hospital, 49 Ill. App. 
2cl :rn;, 199 NE 2d 633. It cannot be doubted that mod-
em tribunals consider the discovery doctrine to be the bet-
k1'. more equitable rule. 
/,Jrhotcgh other case law may be cited, the entire case 
of the Respondents really depends upon a favorable inter-
pretation of two Utah cases, to-wit: Peteler v. Robinson, 
81 Ut. 535, 17 P2d 244, and Passey v. Budge, 85 Ut. 37, 38 
P2d 712. The Appellant respectfully states that the Utah 
rnses cited above do not stand for the proposition for which 
they were cited in the lower court; that the principle of the 
s;atute of limitations in malpractice cases begins running 
r;t '.he dilie of the negligent act rather than at the date of 
tli~covcry by the plaintiff. 
In the Peteler case, the physician performed a negli-
gent opratioa to remove the plaintiff's tonsils and contin-
ued to treat the plaintiff until 1926. The actinn for the 
n•sulting injury incurred by the operation of 1919 was not 
commenced until 1927. The eight year lapse in time was 
not viewed as an obstacle by the court, however, which re-
verS<'d and held for the plaintiff on the ground that the stat-
ute of limitations did not bar recovery where the conduct 
of the physician was a continuing form of negligence. In 
p01ssing, however, the court made comments in the form of 
obiter dicta, that would imply that had the doctor not con-
tinued to treat the patient, the statute of limitations might 
have begun running when the operation was performed. 
As mere dicta, the court's remarks in Peteler need 
not concern us long. These remarks, however, are under-
:-;t andable in view of the early date of the case and the fact 
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that in 1932 the clear majority of American decisions, un-
like today, supported the court's comments_ Despite the 
unfavorable dicta, however, the Peteler opinion is liberal 
in tone and, in its day, represented a step in the liberal 
trer:a.1 already mentioned. 
The . dicta of Petele1· is also made mo1·e understandable 
when viewed in the light of the special facts of that casr. 
In Peteler, unlike the instant case, the patient's ailment 
was tonsillitus and and the operation was merely a tonsil-
lectomy. Certainly, the disease was common enough to 
the layman's experience and the operation was minor 
enough that the patient should have been alarmed when 
he not only failed to improve after a few years, but got 
lock-jaw, rceived injury to his vocal cords, heart and ner-
vous systems, and suffered infection of both ears, which 
ultimately resulted in loss of hearing. This might have 
doomed the Plaintiff's case had not the doctrine of contin-
uing treatment saved it. 
In sharp contrast, the Appellant in the instant case 
had little rason to suspect that his symptoms were due to 
the Respondents' negligent act: The patient had recently 
undergone a series of major, somewhat complicated oper-
ations, in the lower part of his body which neither he nor 
the general public could be expected to understand; the 
seriousness of the patient's original ailment was such that 
he correctly expected a great deal m suffering in his lower 
body. This was so unalarming that even his family doctor 
and the many other physicians whom he subsequently 
complained to, failed to see anything unusual about it and 
told him not to worry (Christiansen Deposition, pp. 19, 21. 
43 and 47. In fairness, can the Resporndent reaHy expect 
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the Appellant to have recognized and called the Respond-
rnt's attention to his negligence when even the many 
trained doctors to whom the Appellant complained of the 
pain never suspected the cause until tJhe X-ray was taken'? 
Mere knowldge of the pain was not enough. The Ap-
µellant went to numerous doctors in a vain attempt to elim-
iriate the pain and other symptoms. He cannot realistic-
,,IJy be expected to have returned to Dr. Rees (continuing 
treatment doctrine) unless he had some reason to suspect 
first, that the pain 'and other symptoms were caused by 
L11e Respondent's operation and, second, that the operation 
had tortiously or wrongfully caused him injury. 
Nor can it be claimed that the Appellanit did not tcy 
to find out the cause of the pain. The record shows that 
he went to numerous (at least 4) doctors after the opera-
tion und he asked them, frequently, about the problem. 
(Christiansen Deposition, pp. 22 and 23). The reason he 
did not suspect the cause of his troubles was that he was 
repeatedly reassured by his physicians that the sympt.oms 
would eventually go away and that they were normal or 
due to some other problem suclh a:s gall bladder trouble. 
Quite naturally, he believed what his doctors told him; yet 
he remained sufficiently alarmed to go to four different 
doctors before the needle was discovered. 
The second and most important case to Respondent's 
position is Passey v. Budge, 85 Utah 37, 38 P2d 712. Jn 
this case the defendant removed the plaintiff's toosils but 
in doing so caused a portion of the scalpel blade to break. 
The blade fell down the plaintiff's throat and the defend-
ant failed to remove the broken piece of steel. This oper-
ation took place on May 13, 1925. From that time on the 
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plaintiff went to the defendant for treatment until .June 
17, 1930. Subsequent to that date she discovered the prrs-
cr r.c of the broken blade in her body and it was removed 
on January 6, 1932. The actiorn was commenced there-
after and the defendant claims that it was barred by thP 
Statu1e of Limitations. The Court in this instance relied 
upe>n the Petcler case; thus the cited cases of the defcncl-
cint did not apply. The case, by the same dicta, indicated 
t~;at peThaps a different rule would apply had the action 
been commenced more than three years after the alleged 
negligernt operation. 
We respectfully submit that the two Utah cases cited 
by the Defendant are merely obiter dicta so far as this par-
ticular issue is concerned and that Utah has not considered 
a case such as the instant case. There is no Utah rule; 
consequently, one has to look to other primary authority 
to determine the law. 
There are two lines of authority concerning the sanw 
question. So far as the Appellant can determine they are 
about equally divided. 
We believe that the Utah Court has consistently fol-
lowed the California decisions and that California is the 
prime source of authority for Utah cases where the Utah 
Court it.self has not decided. Under the circumstances, it 
is merely a question of which line of authority this Court 
\vants to follow. We respectfully submit that the best line 
of authority is the one that renders substantial justice anrl 
does not bar a person from bringing an action for a con· 
dition caused by the negligent conduct of another when tfue 
circumsrt:ances of the other persons' negligence were un-
known to the plaintiff and could not be kn{)IW!l to the plain· 
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tiff by reason of ordinary care. We respectfully submit 
that the purpose of law is to render justice between the 
parties and that any other rule which would prevent a per-
son from seeking his remedy within a reasonable time after 
the cause of injury is known, is a bad doctrine and not con-
sistent with justice and is inconsistent with the newer and 
better reasoned rule. The rule as stated by the California 
Court is as follows: 
"That where a foreign substance is negligently le£t in 
a patient's body by a physician, surgeon, or dentist and 
the patient is ignorant of the fact, and consequently 
of his right of action for malpractice, the limitation 
pe2·iod does not begin to run against a malpractice 
action until the patient learns or, in the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of 
the presence of such foreign substance in his body." 
Huysman v. Korsch (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P(2d) 
908. 
Ehlen v. Burrows (1942) 51 Cal. 2nd 141, 124 P (2d) 
82. 
Pellett v. Sonstone Corp. (1942) 55 Cal. App. 2d 196, 
130 p (2d) 181. 
The case of Agnew v. Larson, a 194 7 California case, 
cited at 185 P2d 851, digests some of the earlier decisions 
on the question. In the Agnew case the defendant con-
tended that the rule applied in California cases identical to 
the instant case was not applicable to the Agnew case for 
reason that this was the prescribing of medicine ratlher 
than the performance of a negligent operation. In the 
Agnew case the Judge said, after analyzing the sw-gery 
;·qses, the following: 
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"Defendant, while conceding the applicability of the 
foregoing rule to cases arising out of surgery, in which 
the patient subsequently discovers foreign substances 
such as sponges, clamps, tubes pieces of broken bones 
and other obects to have been left in his body, con-
tends that it does not apply to the administration or 
introduction into the patient's body of a drug or medi-
cine. We fail to find any basis of differentiation, how-
ever, in the respective situations." 
The Com t went on to hold, therefore, in the Agnew 
case, that the Statute of Limitations did not run until dis-
covery of the condition. 
In a case entited Faith v. Earhart, 52 Cal. App. 2d 228. 
126 P2d 151, the Court denied the defendant's plea in bar 
of th2 Statute of Limitations in a situation where a dentist 
had failed to remove broken bones or the roots of teeth. 
after maldng extractions and notwithstanding the fact that 
the plaintiff did not discover the dentist's error for ten and 
one-half years thereafter when x-ray films revealed to her 
for the first time the presence of the said broken roots. 
Bowers v. Olch, 120 CA 2d 108, 260 P2d 997, was a 
malpractice action, commenced within a year after plaintiff 
discovered that a needle was left in his abdomen after a 
surgical operntion on him in a hospital. ~he court held 
the action was not barred by the Statute of Limitations as 
to hospital's resident surgeon participating in operation. 
which was performed over one year before the commence-
ment of the action, because the Statute of Limitations did 
not commernce to run as to such surgeon until the plaintiff 
discoveTed that the needle was left in his body. 
In Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 389 P3d 224. 
86 Idaho 485, it was determined that a patient's cause of 
15 
action for malpractice arising out of the fact that a sur-
geon left a gauze sponge in the patient when performing an 
operation in 1948 was not barred by the Statute of Limita-
tions although the suit was not brought until 1962, when 
the presence of the sponge was discorvered after an explor-
a w1·y operation was performed in 1961. 
It is interesting to note at this time, the most recent 
case concerning this area of the law, especially since it is 
from the sister State of Montana. This case overrules a 
long standing µrecedent and interprets a statute almost 
identical to our statute. The court held the statute begins 
to run upon discovery of the injury, not upon commission 
of the tort. A synopsis of the case is reported in the 
American Trial Lawyers Association Newsletter, Vol. 9, 
No. 7, page 222, dated September, 1966. Because the edi-
tor of the Newsletter put the reasoning so eloquently, Ap-
pellant quotes the article from the aibove cited Newsletter. 
The case is Johnson v. St. Patrick's Hospital, 417 P2d 
169 Mont. (Decided August 8, 1966). 
"One of the most gnarly problems in the intractable 
area of medical malpractice is when the statute of limi-
tations begins to run in cases of undiscovered malprac-
tice, such as those in which the surgeon sews up a 
foreign object inside the surgical wound. How shoud 
the law handle the problem of the forgotten s1xmge, 
Kelly damp, hemostat, or other examples of miscel-
laneous misplaced surgical hardware? The "foreign-
object" cases are classic examples of inherently un-
knowable harms, and to apply the strict general rule 
that the statute of limitations starts to run from the 
date of the malpractice (closing of incision) and not 
the date of its diligent discovery, harshly insisting that 
blameless ignorance of the injury does not prevent the 
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cause of action from accruing and the statute from 
running would seem to be gross unfairness and a wen 
0!1 the fair face of justice. 
The modern trend is to avoid this harsh rule and to 
allow the malpractice victim to bring an action at any 
time ·within the statutory period following discovery 
of defendant's malpractice. See, e.g., Johnson v. CaJd-
well, 123 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1963) ("S~mply and 
clearly stated the discovery rule is: The limitation 
statute or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to 
run until the date of discovery, or the date wlvn. bY 
the exercise of reasonable care, plaintiff should haw 
discovered the wrongful act We an: p:'r-
suacled we should adopt the rationale of the discovery 
doctrine"), Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 195cJI, 
25 NACCA L.J. 131-38 (statute began to run not wh?n 
surgeon left sponge in plaintiff's abdomen during an 
operation, but when patient discovered presence of 
sponge. almost 9 years later); Fernandi v. Strully, lTl 
A.2d 277 (N . .T. 1961) (surgeon left wing nut from in-
strument used in hysterectomy in patient's body: "Jus-
tice cries out that she fairly be afforded a day in 
court"); 80 ALR2d 368; Louisell & Williams, Trial of 
Medical Malpractice Cases, ss 13.06-13.12. 
Rejecting the cross-grained date-of-malpractice rule, 
the Supreme Court of Montana has just commend-ably 
held that its 3-year malpractice statute of limitations 
started to run from the date the patient discovered or 
should have discovered that a surgical sponge had be?n 
left in his body by hospital employees, and 22£! from 
the date of the negligent act. 
In reaching this equitable result, the court overruled 
a prior inconsistent 94-year-old unjust precedent, there-
by demonstrating that in Torts, no rule is settled until 
it is settled right. Error does not become invulnerable 
with age." 
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Other authorities: 
Rosane v. Singer, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P2d 372. 
Morrison v. Acton, 68 Ariz. 27, 198 P2d 590. 
Stafford v. Schultz, 259 P2d 494 superceded 42 Cal. 2d 
767, 270 P2d 1. 
Myers v. Stevenson, 125 CA 2d 399, 270 P2d 885. 
Hurlimann v. Bank of America, 141 C.A. 2d 801, 297 
P2d 682. 
In the western states, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Mon-
tana and California support the California rule. New Mex-
ico, Washington and Oregon are the only western states 
that have ruled on the subject, that do not support the Cali-
fornia rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully urges the Court to set aside 
the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the 
lower court for trial on the merits. The Appellant respect-
fully contends, (1) that the basic trend in the law today is 
toward the more liberal rule, to-wit: the limitation statute 
or statutes in malpractice cases do not start to run until 
the date of discovery, or the date when, by reasonable care, 
plaintiff should have discovered the wrongful act, and (2), 
that the peculiar facts of this case present a problem not 
Yt't considered by the Utah Court. In view of the above 
ilnd the recent decisions of the Sister States, Appellant re-
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spectfully submits that it would be appropriate for Utah 
to join California, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Montana, 
and allow the Plaintiff to present his case to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
John H. Snow, Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, 701 
Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
_________ day of November, 1966. 
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